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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
GERALD GENE BLUBAUGH,
Defendant-Appellant.

:
:
:
:
:

Court of Appeals 940060-CA
District Court
921400519

:

Priority No. 2

Case No.

:

PETITION FOR REHEARING OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter on
rehearing pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant

seeks

rehearing

by

this

Court

of

the

ruling

sustaining Defendant's conviction of Murder, a First Degree Felony
upon the ground that this Court has overlooked and misconstrued the
prior rulings of the Utah Supreme Court and has misapplied the law
to the facts of this case.
Defendant appealed his conviction for Murder, a First Degree
Felony, and his resulting sentence of five years to life in the
Utah

State

Prison

pursuant

to

Section

76-5-202,

Utah

Code

Annotated, 1953, as amended. The Court has held and ruled that the

Trial Court committed error and abuse of discretion in certain
particulars, but that the error was "harmless" finding that there
is no likelihood that the result would have been different absent
the errors.

In addition, this Court held and ruled that the

evidence at trial was sufficient as a matter of law to sustain the
conviction of the Defendant.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON REHEARING
I

THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL IS INSUFFICIENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF GUILT

II

THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY DEFINING "DEPRAVED
INDIFFERENCE" WAS SUFFICIENTLY OBJECTED TO AND ALSO
CONSTITUTES "PLAIN ERROR"

III

THE COURT'S ERROR IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF
PRIOR VIOLENT ACTS BY THE CO-DEFENDANT WHEN
IN A MEMORY BLACKOUT EPISODE IS HARMFUL ERROR

IV

THE COURT'S ERROR IN EXCLUDING PORTIONS OF TESTIMONY
OF DEFENDANT'S EXPERTS RELATING TO THE PROPENSITY
OF THE CO-DEFENDANT TO VIOLENCE IS HARMFUL ERROR

V

THE COURT'S ERROR IN EXCISING PORTIONS OF THE LETTERS
FROM THE CO-DEFENDANT IS HARMFUL ERROR

VI

ERROR OCCURRED WHEN THE COURT REFUSED TO EXCLUDE THE
CHILD ABUSE SYNDROME EVIDENCE AND THE ERROR IS HARMFUL

VII

THE COURT'S ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS THE
VIDEO TAPE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S HOME IS HARMFUL
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ARGUMENT
I
THE E V I D E N C E INTRODUCED A T T R I A L I S INSUFFICIENT
A S A MATTER O F LAW T O SUPPORT T H E V E R D I C T O F GUILT
The on J y v i lour ,"", at Lxii.il tlial, ituis IJeitiiidaiil did aiiyl . n g t o
cause t h e injuries suffered b y or the death of fourteen moir :; old
Faith Barney w a s base :i ::: i :t the testimony c f Rona Harding.
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described

actions

inconsistent
autopsy,

by

the

child

with the spinal

on

that

injuries

evening

which

later observed

were

in the

Christy Barney, the only witness besides the Defendant

who observed the child on the morning of August 5 before 8:00 a.m.f
testified that when the Defendant left for work, the child appeared
alright, except for the difficulty breathing which improved before
she returned the child to her crib.

The Defendant had no further

contact with the child until summoned to the hospital.

(Trial

Transcript, p. 244)
From the foregoing evidence

it cannot be said that the

elements of depraved indifference murder were supported by the
evidence.

This Court has correctly defined the elements of the

crime as follows:

(1) That the Defendant caused the death;

(2)

That the Defendant's conduct created a grave risk of death to
another;
of death;

(3) That the Defendant knowingly created the grave risk
(4)

That the Defendant's conduct evidenced a depraved

indifference to human life.
The evidence

in this case

simply

does not

support

the

inferences which are necessary to arrive at the verdict rendered.
The verdict, therefore, must not be allowed to stand. This case is
in the image of the case of State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah
1993), where the Utah Supreme Court held as follows:
Even when viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, the State's evidence simply does not support a
4

reasonable inference that the Workmans had the mental
state required by the statute for a lawful conviction*
Criminal convictions cannot rest on conjecture or
supposition; they must be established by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Arguing, as the State does, that
speculative inferences can constitute proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is to attack one of the most sacred
Constitutional safeguards at its core. . . [W]hen the
inference of guilt does not logically flow from the
evidence, it is incumbent on a reviewing court to set the
verdict aside
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that

the

evidence

need

not

exclude

every

"reasonable

alternative

hypothesis."
The import of Tanner, infra., Worthen, infra, and Workman,
supra, is that when the evidence gives rise to a reasonable
alternative hypothesis other than the guilt of the Defendant, and
when that hypothesis naturally and reasonably flows from all of the
evidence in the case and cannot be excluded by the evidence in the
case, that reasonable alternative hypothesis constitutes reasonable
doubt as a matter of law. In other words, reasonable men could not
differ in finding that such an alternative hypothesis is reasonable
and could exist after a fair consideration of the evidence.

The

only contradiction between the Tanner case and the case of Huerta
v. State, 635 S.W.2d 847 (Tex.Ct.App. 1982) is the application of
the term "reasonable". The existence of "a hypothesis" such as in
Worthen,

infra, may not

rise to the level

of a

"reasonable

alternative hypothesis" such as that in Workman, supra, or Tanner,
infra.
Reasonable doubt as to who the perpetrator is exists in this
case as a matter of law.
that,

in

light

of

all

Reasonable men cannot differ in finding
of

the

evidence

and

after

a

fair

consideration of that evidence, that it is "reasonable" that Ms.
Barney, the child's mother, may have caused the death of the child
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INDIFFERENCE" WAS SUFFICIENTLY OBJECTED TO
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In fact, the statement that an instruction is a correct
statement of the law is not a concurrence that it is a good
instruction.

Moreover, counsel for the Defendant urged the Court

to give the defense's alternate instruction which more adequately
defined the term "depraved indifference" and so argued to the trial
Court.

That urging fell on deaf ears and the Court gave the

inadequate instruction #4. To suggest that counsel "invited" the
error is to ignore the plain facts.
Furthermore, the instruction #4 is plain error on its face.
Rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that this Court
may

take

into

consideration

"plain

error"

that

affects

the

"substantial rights" of a party even though the error was not
brought to the attention of the Court.

State v. Brown, No. 900148

(Utah 1992); State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989).

The

standard in finding plain error requires that first, the error be
plain, i.e. the record must indicate that it should have been
obvious to the trial court that it was committing error.

Second,

the error must affect the substantial rights of the accused, i.e.
that the error is harmful.

State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36

(Utah 1989).
Instruction #4 fits this definition precisely.

Furthermore,

plain error was argued by the defense in the main appeal.

The

definition of the element of depraved indifference are certainly
8

material in this case. No case could be more plain on its face as
creating "manifest injustice" than is this case. This Court should
take up the issue of Instruction No. 4 and should reverse on that
ground.
Ill
THE COURT'S ERROR IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF
PRIOR VIOLENT ACTS BY THE CO-DEFENDANT WHEN
IN A MEMORY BLACKOUT EPISODE IS HARMFUL ERROR
This Court ruled that the trial Court's exclusion of evidence
of prior violent acts while in a black out state by Christy Barney
constituted error and an abuse of discretion but that the error was
harmless. This Court apparently failed to consider that while some
evidence found its way into the record on that issue, the trial
Court's ruling still prevented counsel from using that evidence in
its presentation to the jury.
First, the trial Courtfs ruling specifically prevented the
Defendant's expert witnesses from using the evidence of prior
violent acts as a partial basis for their examination of Ms. Barney
and their findings as to her condition and propensity for violence.
Without the ability to testify as to their basis for those
findings, the entire testimony of the experts was diluted in its
delivery to the jury. The jury was left to wonder and speculate as
to how the doctors could arrive at their conclusions about Ms.
Barney.
9

Moreover,

the

trial

Court's

ruling

absolutely

prevented

counsel for the Defendant from arguing the evidence to the jury.
Without the ability to argue Ms. Barney's prior violent acts during
blackout episodes, the defense was precluded from arguing the nexus
between Ms. Barney's known proclivity for violent acts during
blackouts and the probability that Ms. Barney had caused the death
of this child while not remembering her actions in so doing.
Argument of the evidence is a most basic right of a Defendant as
well as of the State.

Argument is the opportunity to call to the

minds of the jury certain segments of evidence which may have
seemed insignificant at the time of introduction but which are
important to the fabric of the theory of the case. The preclusion
from argument, standing alone, is sufficient harm to find this
particular error of the trial Court "harmful".
Indeed, this Court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that
if the defense were allowed to introduce the evidence of Ms.
Barney's prior history for violence during blackout episodes during
the testimony of the experts, thereby providing the foundation for
their

findings,

that

the

result

would

have

been

the same.

Certainly, this Court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that if
the defense were allowed to argue that evidence to the jury in
light of all of the other evidence in this case that the result

10

would have been no different.

The error is harmful and the

judgment must be reversed.
IV
THE COURT'S ERROR IN EXCLUDING PORTIONS OF TESTIMONY
OF DEFENDANT'S EXPERTS RELATING TO THE PROPENSITY
OF THE CO-DEFENDANT TO VIOLENCE IS HARMFUL ERROR
The defense expert witnesses, Dr. Robert Howell and Dr.
Richard Wootton, made specific findings relating to the propensity
or probability of Ms. Barney inflicting the injuries on Faith
Barney resulting in her death but later having no memory of the
events. Those findings were based, in part, on Ms. Barney's prior
history of engaging in bizarre and violent behavior while in
blackout episodes.

The trial Court precluded the experts from

testifying as to the prior episodes and the violent acts of Ms.
Barney.
For the reasons argued in Point III above, that ruling was
error and this Court has found it to be error and an abuse of
discretion. The error is harmful because it cuts out the heart of
the findings and opinions of the expert witnesses and leaves the
jury to speculate as to the logical basis of the nature of the
conclusions made. This Court has overlooked the harmful nature of
this particular error and the resulting speculation to which the
jury is left.

11

Moreover, this Court has overlooked the fact that the State
actually led the Court into that error in the argument in support
of the objection. A holding that such an error is harmless serves
to encourage the State to continue to create the error with the
expectation that a conviction is, nevertheless, safe from reversal.
The error is prejudicial and harmful in this case the conviction
must be reversed.
V
THE COURTfS ERROR IN EXCISING PORTIONS OF THE LETTERS
FROM THE CO-DEFENDANT IS HARMFUL ERROR
The letters are a supreme example of evidence which forms an
indispensable part of the fabric of the defense theory of the case.
The letters, authored by Christy Barney, demonstrate the different
and various personalities which Ms. Barney exhibits when in her
blackout episodes and the way her behavior and manner of thinking
changes.

When the trial Court excised portions of the letters

which referred to Ms. Barney's prior violent acts, the jury was
deprived of an opportunity to place those facts into perspective.
The minor reference which accidently made its way to the jury due
to an oversight in preparation of the documents for submission
amounts to firing a slingshot in the face of a tank.
This Court has held the trial Court ruling to excise those
portions of the letters to be error.

The error is obviously

harmful due to the lost opportunity by the jury to fit together the
12

changed demeanor of Ms. Barney with the relation of the prior acts
of violence.

One needs only to read the letters, once including

the excised portions, and once overlooking those portions, to
understand the harmful nature of that error.
VI
ERROR OCCURRED WHEN THE COURT REFUSED TO EXCLUDE THE
CHILD ABUSE SYNDROME EVIDENCE AND THE ERROR IS HARMFUL
This Court has held that admission of the evidence of child
abuse syndrome was not error because, "Although the evidence of
abuse was not linked to defendant, the jury could draw reasonable
inferences therefrom,

.

.

"

(Court's opinion, p. 12)

Apparently, this Court believes that the jury may draw inferences
from the evidence of abuse that, therefore, the Defendant is the
abuser.
In so holding, this Court has overlooked the previous holdings
of the Utah Supreme Court and the holding of this Court is in
conflict therewith.

In the case of State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539

(Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that while evidence of
"battered child syndrome" is admissible in a prosecution for
causing the death of the child, the relevance thereof is limited to
proving cause of death and establishing the lack of accident or
mistake relating to the injuries sustained by the child which
resulted in death.

In so holding, however, the Court went on to

13

say:
Again we emphasize that: evidence regarding the child's
physical condition does not directly indicate the
culpability of any particular defendant.
Tanner, 675 P.2d at 543
In the case of State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988), the
Utah Supreme Court held:
Battered child syndrome evidence is not by itself
probative of who did the battering and, without
additional evidence, would be inadequate as a matter of
law to convict. There must be some evidence that the
defendant charged with the crime was the person who
inflicted the injury.
Worthen, Id. at 848
In other words, the evidence of child abuse syndrome is
relevant on the issue of cause of death and the lack of an accident
to explain the injuries. However, unless the injuries to the child
can be linked to the particular Defendant or unless the history of
abuse can be attributed to that Defendant, the evidence of child
abuse syndrome is irrelevant and immaterial on the issue of guilt
of that Defendant.

Moreover, the evidence of prior child abuse

perpetrated by an unknown person becomes more "prejudicial than
probative" and should be excluded.
Of necessity, when proving that a child has suffered from
"battered child syndrome", one is drawn to the issue of who is
responsible for the pattern of battering.

Frequently evidence of

the history of battering and evidence of a defendant's prior
14

treatment of the child, i.e. history of battering the child, become
intertwined.

On the subject of admissibility of evidence of the

defendant's history of treatment of the child, the Court in State
v. Tanner, supra., stated as follows:
In cases of child abuse, such as the one before us,
evidence of specific instances of the defendant's
treatment of the child is relevant to establish not
merely a general disposition for violence or ill-will
towards all children, but to establish a specific pattern
of behavior by the defendant toward one particular child,
the victim.
Tanner, 675 P.2d at 546.
However, the Court went on to say:
The two categories of evidence should, of course, be
corroborative in order to support a conviction. This
pattern of behavior by the defendant is relevant to
establishing absence of accident or mistake (as held by
numerous courts), opportunity, knowledge or the identity
of the defendant as the person responsible for the crime
charged.
Tanner, Id. at 546-7.
In

this

corroborative.

case,

the

two

categories

of

evidence

are not

The Trial Court should have excluded the evidence

of child abuse syndrome in the absence of competent
linking the abuse to this Defendant.

evidence

This Court, upon further

reflection, should hold in accordance with the prior decisions of
the Utah Supreme Court on that subject and reverse the conviction
in light of the error of the trial Court.

15

VII
THE COURT'S ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS THE
VIDEO TAPE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S HOME IS HARMFUL
This Court has held that the trial Court erred in admitting
the video tape of Defendant and his home he shared with Ms. Barney.
In holding that such error was harmless, this Court has apparently
overlooked the prejudicial effect on the jury to allow the State to
emphasize the condition of the home and the manner of dress and
appearance of the Defendant.

In addition, the video tape was

relied upon by the State to illustrate the seeming lack of care
demonstrated in the tone of voice of the Defendant and that of Ms.
Barney.

None of that was proper and it should not have been

allowed to prejudice the jury in assessing the evidence.
The Court of Appeals of Arizona has held that when "[a] 11 that
was implied [by the video] was that the possession of a warrant
coupled with the shoddy nature of defendant's home made it more
likely that defendant was guilty, ,f the videotape evidence is
irrelevant and inadmissible.

State v. Britain, 752 P.2d 37, 38

(Ariz.App. 1988).
If the evidence admitted in error makes it more likely that
the Defendant is guilty, how can a reviewing Court say that the
result would have been the same?

In this case, the quantity and

quality of evidence against the Defendant was, to say the least,

16

not extensive. The error was prejudicial and the conviction should
be reversed,
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Defendant, by and through his counsel,
submits that any of the above errors would be sufficiently harmful
to reverse the conviction.

Taken as a whole, the nature of the

errors of the trial Court form a quantum of harm and the conviction
should be reversed and remanded for a new trial in accordance with
the decision of this Court.
Submitted this

/>

day of October, 1995.

D.^OHN MUSSELMAN
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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